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Electricity Services Based Dependability Model of Power Grid
Communication Networking
Jiye Wang, Kun Meng , Junwei Cao, Zhen Chen, Lingchao Gao, and Chuang Lin
Abstract: The technology of Ultra-High Voltage (UHV) transmission requires higher dependability for electric power
grid. Power Grid Communication Networking (PGCN), the fundamental information infrastructure, severs data
transmission including control signal, protection signal, and common data services. Dependability is the necessary
requirement to ensure services timely and accurately. Dependability analysis aims to predicate operation status
and provide suitable strategies getting rid of the potential dangers. Due to the dependability of PGCN may be
affected by external environment, devices quality, implementation strategies, and so on, the scale explosion and
the structure complexity make the PGCN’s dependability much challenging. In this paper, with the observation of
interdependency between power grid and PGCN, we propose an electricity services based dependability analysis
model of PGCN. The model includes methods of analyzing its dependability and procedures of designing the
dependable strategies. We respectively discuss the deterministic analysis method based on matrix analysis and
stochastic analysis model based on stochastic Petri nets.
Key words: power grid communication networking; dependability; stochastic Petri nets; strategy design
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Introduction

Dependability reflects the ability that a system works
well under given loads, and it was determined
comprehensively by system’s internal feature and
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potential work loads[1] . Dependability analysis is a loop
of evaluating current status, computing improvement
strategies, implementation, and reevaluation, and aims
to construct appreciate models supporting the above
procedure[2] . At present, pursuing more robust and
intelligent power grid is the main goal of power grid
operation enterprises, such as State Grid Company
of China (SGCC) has planned to invest 1.6 trillion
RMB to build the robust smart grid. More information
technology will be applied to improve the intelligence
of the power grid, though Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) devices have been deployed in
recent power transmission systems. As a result, the
power grid is evolving into a critical Cyber-Physical
System (CPS)[3, 4] , and many necessary requirements
have to be discussed[5-7] .
The Power Grid Communication Networking
(PGCN) is in charge of transmitting data to desired
destinations to support the power grid services,
faces challenge to ensure data transmission timely
and accurately[8-10] . In other words, the information
infrastructure is supporting the control, monitoring,
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the maintenance, and the exploitation of power supply
systems, so power services require information
infrastructure more dependable and efficiency,
especially for PGCN. The interdependence of
them has been studied in literatures[11, 12] . To
predicate the status of PGCN and to arrange suitable
predetermined strategies are instinctive to enhance
its dependability. However, the scale of devices
and the diversification of tasks impede the practice
evaluating PGCN correctly and timely[13] . To realize
the aforementioned goals, Budka et al.[10] discussed
the basic design principles based on many kinds
of potential applications smart grid should support
and suggest a possible architecture. In Ref. [9],
many features the system should have are discussed,
such as performance, availability, reliability, and
security. Niyato et al.[14] gave a reliability analysis
method and the optimal design principles for the
redundant design. Reference [15] gives reliability
analysis model aimed at deployment of communication
lines and takes the SONNET for an example to illustrate
techniques of modeling, simplification, calculation,
and analysis. However, most of current research
mainly concentrates the networking structure and the
failure of its components instead of considering the
interdependence between power grid and PGCN.
This paper focuses on the dependability of PGCN and
attempts to present a lightweight evaluation method. On
the observation of power grid services bridging the
power grid and PGCN, as shown in Fig. 1, we propose
the power grid services based model which not only
considers the structure features and implementation
specifications of PGCN, but also takes account of
interdependence of power grid and PGCN.

2

Background

2.1

Smart grid and its communication networking

An electric grid is an interconnected network
for delivering electricity power from suppliers to

Fig. 1

Interdependence between power grid and PGCN.

consumers. It consists of power stations generating
electricity power, high-voltage transmission lines,
and distribution lines. The smart grid is viewed as
modernized electrical grid that uses information
and communication technology to gather and act
on information in an automated fashion to improve
the efficiency, reliability, and sustainability of the
production and distribution of electricity[3] . Therefore,
the smart grid contains the power grid infrastructure
and information infrastructure. The power grid
infrastructure ensuring electricity power flows
safely and efficiently is called the power grid
infrastructure. Collecting, transmitting, and processing
all kinds of information are tasks of information
infrastructure. Control or scheduling centers act
as brain of the smart grid and decide feasible
strategies of collecting information and implemention
control. PGCN conveys a variety of information to
ensure performance of the smart grid, and many control
centers are connected with PGCN. In a word, the
smart grid is a critical CPS. Figure 2 shows a typical
structure.
As Fig. 1 mentioned, any power grid event will
stimulate several power grid services (e.g., relay
protection and remote operation), and every power
grid service applies a set of PGCN components. Thus,
improper configuration will cause performance
decrease or non-applicable of PGCN. On the other side,
any PGCN component fails may affect the function of
some power grid services and cause serious power grid
outage.
2.2

PGCN structure and operation specifications

PGCN was built incrementally. Usually, mainstream
communication lines are deployed as an ancillary
of power lines, and are managed by different
administration domains (e.g., national backbone
network, area network, and province network)
(see Fig. 3). The carriers of PGCN include optical
fiber, cable, Power Line (PL), microwave, satellite,
etc. Allocation strategies of communication resource
are classified into the proactive and reactive. The former
reverses resource for special services and the other is
not permitted to use, on the contrary, the latter just
allocates resource when service arrives. For PGCN of
SGCC, the proactive strategies are used extensively. For
example, when each power grid service is planned to
use a communication line, a 2-Mbit/s bandwidth of this
line is reversed to it. The reactive strategies are used
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Fig. 2

Fig. 3

A typical smart grid structure.

Administration and operation of PGCN.

for non-power grid services, such as OA system, visual
meeting, and so on. Since we aim to study methods to
ensure power grid operation, the proactive strategies
are assumed to be used in the following analysis.
For sake of security and reliability, every service
should be set at least two communication paths they
are separated physically. See Fig. 3, for any power
grid services, such as production, transmission, and
scheduling, it has at least two sets of communication
devices. The ordinary backup strategy include MSP1 C
1, SNCP1 C 1, etc.
2.3

Communication
services

patterns

of
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power

grid

The supported power grid services contain production
control, transmission control, and power scheduling,
and they have various forms, such as voice, control
signal, and monitoring information. Production control

service aims to adjust workload of power plants
according to the predication of consumption in the
next period, and keeps balance between supply
and consumption. This corresponding communication
consists of information collection stage and control
signal distribution stage and any fault during the
above stages will lead to service outage. This
type of service always has different sources and
destination nodes. Scheduling control is the process of
distributing commands to control devices. Delay and
loss of commands will decrease power grid operation
performance. Transmission control is in charge of
monitoring and regulating power quality of electricity
power. The typical service of transmission control
includes protection, security, stability control, and so
on. PGCN provides functions of direct communication
and alarm between devices, sending current status
information to the substation or dispatch centers.
For the convenience of description, based on
the relationship between the source node and
the destination node of information transmission,
the service can be divided into direct connect
type, relay type, and gathering-feedback type,
as shown in Fig. 4. Direct connect type is that
existing communication lines between the source
and the destination supporting the service. Relay
type is that there is no direct communication line,
communication between them relies on the intermediate
nodes. Gathering-feedback type means that there is
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failure may cause a chain of failures. Escalating failure
will become more serious if it was not repaired
timely. The failure in PGCN includes line failure and
node failure. Line failures break all traffic running on
it, and may result in outage or performance decrease of
transmission. Node failures imply all devices deployed
in this site out of work, will result in all traffic through
this site outage.
Fig. 4 Types of power grid services: (a) Direct connect type;
(b) Relay type; (c) Gathering-feedback type.

only one source or destination node, the relationship of
each pair of the source and destination might be direct
or relay.
2.4

Dependability impact factors

An undirected graph G may represent a PGCN,
and nodes are communication site generating or
transmitting data. The edge indicates where there
exists channel among sites. In SGCC, the PGCN
is a dedicated network with physical isolation,
and the Virtual Circuit (VC) is set for every
special power grid service. Services have individual
requirements for reliability, timeliness, and continuity
of transmission. Therefore, the main problems of
dependability of PGCN mainly contain disconnection,
transmission policy confliction, device failures, and so
on[16] . The impact factors include physical environment,
service, and management.
(1) Physical factors (such as natural environment
and intrinsic properties of device). These factors
mainly reflect the impact of the physical properties,
including the inherent failure frequency of devices, the
deployment policy, and the location[17] .
(2) Service factors (such as the burst traffic causing
overload and the deployment conflict of services).
These factors are caused by lack of enough information,
since the construction is always distributedly and
incrementally.
(3) Management factors (such as maintenance level,
emergency response capability, automation degree, and
so on). These factors reflect the impact of the subjective
initiatives, compliance with standards is the primary
requirement.
The PGCN may be abnormal or failure caused by
the combination of several above factors[18] . Failures
might be divided into the ordinary, the cascading,
and escalating ones. Ordinary failure can be called
isolated failure meaning it does cause others. Cascading

2.5

Dependability metrics for PGCN

Efficiency, survivability, and invulnerability are studied
for dependability analysis of PGCN. From the view
of administration, many researchers give dependability
metric systems with respect to function layers of
PGCN respectively. Concluding the existed results,
we propose the PGCN dependability index system
including availability, data quality, and maintainability,
which reflects the features of leveled indexes and
requirement of power grid services. Table 1 shows their
relationship.
Formally, availability is defined as the probability of a
service was finished within the fixed time interval, if the
service is served by the PGCN. The availability is AC D
Prft t0 6 ıg , where t0 is the time a power grid service
submits the request to PGCN, and t is the time the data
arrives at its destination. If ı D 1, the availability
is the probability that no failures occur for nodes and
edges. Data quality is measured with bit error ratio,
loss ratio of packets, delay, and jitter. The detail can be
found in Ref. [2]. Maintainability indicates the ability
that a system may find failures and repair them. Mean
Time To Repair (MTTR) and fault tolerance degree are
two indexes reflecting the maintainability.

3
3.1

Electric Services Based Dependability
Model of the PGCN
Overview

Considering comprehensively effect of power grid
services, in this part, we propose a model evaluating
dependability of PGCNs. We shall discuss quantitative
analysis methods from both deterministic and stochastic
perspectives, which helps administrators to take
reasonable strategies when they are requested to deploy
new power grid services.
The dependability model includes the stages of
constructing PGCN model, dependability analysis,
and judging and computing strategies, as shown in
Fig. 5. Network structure, services and management
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Analysis of dependability metrics of PGCN.

Leveled dependability factors
Description
Node invulnerability
Topology
Link invulnerability
Bandwidth
Delay
Routing
Jitter
Packet loss rate
Throughput
E/M failure rate
Devices
FXO failure rate
V.24 failure rate
Natural conditions
Operation
Human factors
Management
Workload
Frequency
Traffic complexity
Layer

Availability
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C

Service-based dependability metrics
Data quality
Maintainability
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C

Notes: “C” indicates that two indexes are correlated.

Fig. 5

Services-based dependability model of PGCN.

policies are necessary parameters to construct a
proper model. The value of dependability is computed
by adopting deterministic and stochastic analysis
methods. As it does not meet the dependability
requirement, finding an improvement strategies is
necessary.

With the development of dependability model,
dependability analysis shall be a necessary work for
running PGCNs, and it should attempt to beforehand
find vulnerability, security risks, and trend predication
according to various information. The model may
be used in the following stages: deploying new
services, updating PGCNs, common operation, and
emergency response. When planning a deployment
policy for power grid services, the model aims
to determine interdependence among them and the
optimal strategy. For the common operation, studying
status of PGCN and enhancing resource utilization
can achieve by the model. Using the model might
improve efficiency of emergency response when some
events happen. We analyze dependability of PGCN
by penetrating two kinds of failure patterns like
Fig. 1. The first describes that a power grid event
stimulates many services and PGCN receives a burst
traffic request. Finding the bottleneck is its primary
goal. The second indicates some components of PGCN
were broken and might result in power grid service out
of work and power grid outage. Determining how scale
of the power grid is affected is its primary goal. We
give respectively deterministic and stochastic methods
to deal with the above two cases.
3.2

Constructing dependability model

In this part, we introduce two methods constructing
the dependability analysis model of PGCN: the matrix
model and Petri nets model.
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3.2.1

Matrix model

Given a PGCN, denoted with G, where nodes represent
communication sites or devices and edges represent
communication lines. For one power grid service, its
communication strategy is a sub-graph of G. Figure
6 models a PGCN and two services’ communication
strategies (the primary 1-2-3-6 and the secondary 1-4-56 are for service 1-6, the primary 2-5 and the secondary
2-1-4-5 are for service 2-5). We define the networking
matrix and service matrix to represent the PGCN and its
services respectively.
A PGCN G with n sites can be described as an
n  n matrix, where entity eij D 1 if there exists an
edge between nodes i and j or the device is well if
i D j . We call the matrix networking matrix. Formally,
for 1 6 i; j 6 n; eij D 1 means there exists a direct
communication line between i and j , and eij D 0
indicates there is no lines between i and j or the
line fails. Then if a failure happens, the networking
matrix should update according to the following
specifications: If i j breaks, then the resulting matrix
G0 D Œe 0  is obtained through: (1) eij0 D ej0 i D 0;
0
0
0
0
0
0
(2) emm
D emm ; (3) emk
D ekm
D emm
ekk
emk
, where
for 1 6 k; m 6 n. A communication strategy matrix is
obtained by the following stages: If a service has one
primary and x secondary predetermined paths, node i is
used in the above paths, then ei i D 1. For the primary
path, if i j belongs to it, then eij D 1. For a secondary
path numbered the k-th, a0 a1    ak 1 ak ,
eij D 1 if exj D 0 for x ¤ j or eij D 1, otherwise,
eij D 1.k/. Any failure shall update the matrix, and the
updating speciation is same as the networking matrix.
For above example, we obtain the matrix models as
follows.

0

1
B1
B
B
B0
B
B1
GDB
B0
B
B
B0
B
@1
1

0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
B1
B
T2-5 D B
@1
0
0
1 1
B1 1
B
B0 1
B
T1-6 D B
B1 0
B
@0 0
0 0

1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1

0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1

0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1

1
1
0
1

1
0
1
1

0
1C
C
C;
1A
1

0
1
1
0
0
1

1
0
0
1
1
0

0
0
0
1
1
1

1
0
0C
C
C
0C
C
0C
C;
0C
C
C
0C
C
0A
1

1
0
0C
C
1C
C
C:
0C
C
1A
1

Assuming the site 4 fails, Tx .Y / represents the
matrix of the service x under the failure Y . For above
example, we get the following matrices.
0
1
1 1 0 0 0 0
B 1 1 1 0 0 0C
B
C
B 0 1 1 0 0 1C
B
C
T1-6 .4/ D B
C;
B 0 0 0 0 0 0C
B
C
@ 0 0 0 0 1 1A
0 0 1 0 1 1
1
0
1 1 0 0
B1 1 0 1C
B
C
T2-5 .4/ D B
C:
@0 0 0 0A
0 1 0 1
Based on the obtained matrices, we could analyze
PGCN’s dependability and discuss them in the
following parts.
3.2.2

Fig. 6 An example of PGCN and communication strategy of
power grid services. The services are 1-6 and 2-5, 1-2-3-6 and
1-4-5-6 are the strategy for service 1-6; 2-5 and 2-1-4-5 are
strategy for service 2-5.

1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1

Petri nets model

Let N be natural number set and NC be positive natural
number set. Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) is a six-tuple
SPN D fP; T; ; F; W; M0 g, where P is the place
set, T is the transition set, and .t / is the firing rate
of transition t (if the value is infinite, the transition t
is called immediate one, otherwise it is called timed
one). F  .P T /[.T P / is arc set. W W F ! NC is
weight function set of arcs. M :P ! N is the marking,
and M0 is the initial marking. For x 2 P [ T we
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set : x D fyj.y; x/ 2 F g and x : D fyj.x; y/ 2
F g. x 2 T shall fire if the element  in : x has more than
W .; t/ tokens. After x fires, the marking is changed
as M.p/ D M.p/ W ..p; t // C W ..t; p//. In SPN
model, places and tokens are separately drown as circles
and black dots, timed and immediate transitions are
denoted by boxes and bars respectively, and the arc
weight function is marked on the arc.
By the previous analysis, the communication line
failures will cause services running on this line break,
communication site failures cause that multiple devices
locating in it could not work well. The following SPN
model could reflect the above fact, as shown in Fig. 7.
Sup and Sdown denote the normal state and failure
state of the site respectively. Tsud and Tsdu denote failing
and repair process of the site respectively. Similarly,
Eup ; Edown ; TEud ; TEdu and Lup ; Ldown ; TLud ; TLdu denote
the failing and repair scenarios of equipment and

line respectively. The immediate transition reflects
their relationships. The interdependence between
communication infrastructure and power grid services
is modeled as follows: Failures of communication
infrastructure affect the running of services, taking the
line failure for example, if the performing service T
depends on the line, their relationship can be described
as shown in Fig. 8.
Given a service, we can obtain its SPN model
stage by stage like Fig. 9. The relationship among
stages is described by the serial structure. The detailed
stage model is obtained according to the design of
strategies. Also, transition Cij represents a service
passing the line or communication equipment.
For a service, the strength of traffic affects mainly the
dependability of PGCN, and the traffic model could be
obtained by the following process. Traffic generating to
PGCN consists of two aspects: the first traffic and the
repeated traffic. Consider the effect of the environment,
we can describe it as the following model shown in
Fig. 10.
Transition TPJ represents generating traffic. To
describe the fact that the traffic is processed in parallel,
we model a lot of traffic flows in parallel.
3.3

Fig. 7 SPN model of failure and repair of components in the
PGCN.

Fig. 8

Deterministic analysis

For availability, the aim is to determine whether a
service works well under given failures, and how scale

Model of interdependence between service and PGCN.

Fig. 9
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SPN model of service process.
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Fig. 10

SPN model about traffic generation of services.

of services does a failure affect?
For data quality, if we know that the quality is
determined by the number of available paths (e.g., the
quality is log.xC1/
, where x is the current available
.d C1/
paths and d is predetermined number of paths), the aim
is to judge whether the quality is ensured under given
failures.
For maintainability, we judge it by the fault tolerance
of PGCN, i.e., how many number of failures does the
given strategy endure?
3.4

Stochastic analysis

Stochastic analysis is also called dynamic analysis. For
dependability, we shall analyze the stable distribution
of system states, Mean Time To Breach (MTTB), and
MTTR and determine the most likely failure in the near
future.
MTTB reflects the availability of the system, which
has been widely studied in reliability engineering. In
our model, we focus on the MTTB for all kinds of
special traffic, a service, and the whole system.
MTTR reflects the efficiency of the system to deal
with failure and should include the time of finding and
repairing failures.
Estimating possible threat is another important task
for stochastic analysis, and the state analysis will
support this task.

4

Dependability Analysis of PGCN

4.1
4.1.1

Matrix-based analysis
Key nodes/ key lines

Given a service matrix, using Algorithm 1, we can
easily judge whether the service works well. The
possible of component failure is various with respect

Algorithm 1 Judge whether failures affect services
Input: T x .Y/ D Œeij  is the matrix of service x after failure
Y; A and B are sets of source nodes and terminal nodes, and
V is the set of nodes used in service x.
Output: Whether the service works?
1. Judge whether there is live path between a and b, where
a 2 A, b 2 B:
1.1 If there is no eak D 1,where k ¤ a and k 2 V , there
is no channel between a and b; otherwise, if eaf D 1, let
I D a, get into 1.2
1.2 Let evI D 0, where v 2 V . If f D b, there is the channel
between a and b; otherwise, if there is no ef k D 1, where kf
and k 2 V , get into 1.1; otherwise, if eaf D 1, I D f , get
into 1.1
2. Judge whether a service works
2.1 Test each predetermined path using method 1.
2.2 If there has no path supporting the service, the service
outage; otherwise, the service is ok.

to device types, location, management level, and so
on. The workload of service components supporting
is different. We call a component the key one if the
metric value exceeds a given threshold. The metric
and threshold are selected individually. In this paper,
we just choose the metric as the product of failure
possibility and supported traffic magnitude. In detail,
given a component C, the metric value IC D FC 
TC, where FC is failure possibility of C and TC
is traffic magnitude. For simplicity, we adopt the
normalization value, i.e., IcC D IC =D, where D
is the total number of services supported by this
component. Different weights reflect the primary and
the secondary paths. Simply, if 1 is the weight of the
primary path of services, set 1=2 be the weight of the
second and 1=n be the n-th weight.
Now we will propose an algorithm to determine
key components. Different services have different
importance, so the corresponding traffic is set high,
medium, and low levels. Their weight satisfy Wh >
Wm > Wl . Given failure pattern A, Tv denotes affected
traffic set, let C.A/ and C.A/ be the sum influence and
mean influence of A, then
X
C.A/ D
W .t /;
t 2Tv

C.A/ D

X

W .t /=jTv j:

t2Tv

Suppose the failure probability of A is known, we
obtain the expectation of influence as follows:
C 0 .A/ D C.A/  P and C 0 .A/ D C.A/  P;
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where P D

Y

pr.a/ and pr.a/ is the probability of

a2A

failure a.
We call the failure pattern A the key component
of PGCN if its influence value is larger than a
fixed threshold, U, and jAj 6 L, where L is a fixed
integer. Based on Algorithm 1, we obtain Algorithm 2
to find the key components as follows.
4.1.2

Generating emergency response strategies

Through adopting matrix to represent PGCN, current
status of the PGCN after any failures happened could
be represented by modifying the value of elements in
this matrix (the detail refers to Section 3.2). Here we
present an shortest path distance based algorithm.
In fact, for the given service set T , it is easy
to construct an ancillary matrix G0 D Œeij0  based on
networking matrix G D Œeij  and service matrix set
f
f
f
Af D Œaij
 as follows: (1) If aij
D 1.k/, let aij
Dk
X f
0
0
0
and eij D
aij ; (2) If eij D 0, let eij D 1.

129

Algorithm 3 Design of minimum load path of service
Input: Auxiliary matrix N 0 , the failed service set Tv .
Output: Communication strategies of failed services
1. Given a service T , construct strategy candidates
1.1 Splitting T as the union of subservice that has one source
to multiple destinations, i.e. tx1D1 [ tx2 D2 [ : : : [ txp Dp ,
where jxi j D 1 and jDi j > 1.
1.2 Construct feasible communication strategy of txi Di using
Dijkstra algorithm:
1.2.1 For i < p, construct strategy of txi Di by Dijkstra
algorithm and generate the corresponding service matrix;
1.2.2 Update auxiliary matrix N0 after adding service matrix
txi Di , into A, let i D i C 1 and go to 1.2.1
1.2.3 If i D p, construct strategy of txp Dp and update N0
1.2.4 Collect strategies
2. Judge feasibility of strategies
2.1 Select key components as failure pattern, using Algorithm
1 to judge the proposed strategies;
2.2 If a strategy is affected, update N0 through considering
the failure pattern and go to 1; otherwise go to 2.1;
2.3 Output strategies

f

For the service t, we can obtain a communication
strategy by adopting Dijkstra algorithm on the matrix
N0 . The detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 2 Analysis of the key component of system
Input: Networking matrix N , service set T and its matrix
x
; x 2 T .
Tx D Œeij
Output: The set of the key components
1. Generation of the failure pattern (or key component
candidates) Based on N , the failure set is generated as the
following rules:
(1) eij D 1 implies nodes i; j and edge i
j is the
candidate elements
(2) Fix an upper bound L, constructing Cn` subset of
candidate set, where the number of elements in any subset
is no more than L.
W
(3) Reduce candidates: if A is a candidate and .i 2 A j 2
V
0
A/ .eij 2 A/ is true, then updated candidate A D A=feij g.
Let the candidate set be Ask.
2. Increasingly calculate influence C.A/ or C.A/ of failure
pattern A with respect to the number of elements in it
2.1 Determine the affected service set Tv .A/ using Algorithm
1;
2.2 Calculate C.A/ or C.A/
3. Find the set of the key component
3.1 If C.A/ or C.A/ is greater than the fixed constant, then
the A is a key component ;
3.2 If A is a key component set, the delete candidate B, if
A  B;
3.2 If Ask is not empty, go to step 2, otherwise output all
key component set

4.2
4.2.1

SPN-based analysis
Construction of SPN

For evaluating and designing specific strategies, the
following steps are necessary to be used to construct
the proper models.
Step 1 Collecting all power grid services and
building communication service models using the
method in Section 3.2. For given components including
lines and sites, model them with places. The service
process is modeled from one place to another, and the
transition between them reflects the capability of its
precedent component.
Step 2 Setting traffic generation modular. According
to service pattern modeled in Fig. 4, constructing traffic
generation modular and connecting to corresponding
places of devices. Please see Fig. 10 for constructing
traffic SPN.
Step 3 Modelling failure mode and combining
models. We simply regard any device has just two
states: UP and DOWN, the failure model is represented
by splitting the corresponding device place into two
places, one represent UP and the other is DOWN. They
are connected with transitions shown in Fig. 9.
Step 4
Setting parameters and evaluating
dependability of systems. The historical statistic
data and experience determine the setting of
parameters, we discuss it in the next. The content
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of dependability analysis is discussed in Section 3.4
and the corresponding methods refer to Ref. [2].
For the example shown in Fig. 6, we obtain the model
shown in Fig. 11 using methods from Steps 1-3. Two
services traffic are generated by transitions J16 and J25 .
Failure models of sites 1 and 2 describe the failure
pattern.
4.2.2

Determining parameter value

The value of parameter impacts the accuracy and
validity of results. Here we just discuss the principle
determining parameters including fire rates and initial
marking.
(1) The selection of the stochastic function of
transition occurring
In our model, transitions are separated into traffic
processing transition, traffic generation transition, and
failure pattern transition.
For the first two kinds of transitions, the selected
stochastic function should realize tradeoff between
solvability and correctness. The effect factors include
length of line, the type of equipment/service, location
environment, and management level. Generally, the
average waiting time is inversely proportional with

Fig. 11

factors mentioned above.
For failure pattern transition, the average waiting time
is related to external environment, management level,
and its individual attributes.
(2) Initial marking
Initial marking is an important factors impacting
the results’ accuracy, especially for transient
analysis. Initial marking of SPN model represents the
state of system at the beginning of observation. Token
distribution in places denoting DOWN represents a
special failure pattern. To analyze devices performance,
we always put enough tokens in the traffic generation
places.
4.2.3

Dependability analysis based on SPN

Steady analysis and transient analysis could be
developed by SPNs. The common method includes
the following steps transforming SPN to a stochastic
process, computing steady/transient distribution of
states, and analyzing dependability. Many literature
comprehensively discussed it (see Ref. [2]), in this
paper, we shall omit the detailed calculation process
and just propose how to determine dependability
representation in SPNs.

SPN model of dependability analysis of the example in Fig. 6.
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Given a service, applying Algorithm 1 we can
determine a set of failure pattern denoted by F , which
makes this service outage. We apply the following
technique to reduce F : if A; B 2 F and A  B, then
delete B from F , and denote the reduced set F 0 . We
denote M.f / D 1 if the marking satisfies the following
condition: The corresponding places of f all have at
least one token under the marking M , which implies
W
service outage. Let b
t D minM ftj i M.fi / D 1g
V
and e
t D minM ft j i M.fi / D 0g, thus, for transient
analysis,
MTTB D t t0 ;
where t0 is the beginning time, and
MTTR D e
t b
t:
For steady analysis, the marking set such that
1 means the service outage, the marking
i M.fi / D V
set such that i M.fi / D 0 reflects the service works
well, and the equivalent transforming rates between
them can be used to determine the value of MTTB and
MTTR.
W

5

Conclusions

Dependability analysis is used extensively in computer
networking and complicated systems. PGCN plays
more and more critical role. However, the results
of its dependability analysis show that there lack
dependability models considering the interdependence
between information infrastructure and power grid
infrastructure. Based on analysis of smart grid
PGCN’s structure, power services’ communication
pattern, and dependability impact factors, we present
its dependability metrics and obtain a power grid
services based dependability model of PGCN. Our
model includes modular of model construction, model
analysis, and fault response. We discuss two kinds of
analysis methods, the deterministic and the stochastic,
and provide two analysis techniques respectively. The
matrix-based analysis promotes the efficiency of finding
key components (the important failure patterns) and
designing fault response strategies. For SPN method,
we study several techniques to model the problem in
fine-grained and give dependability definitions based on
SPNs. The proposed methods shall be verified through
real operation in SGCC.
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